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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE JURY AND THE JUVENILE COURT

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
Appellant, age 16, was identified as one of twenty to thirty youths who
allegedly pursued three young teenagers and took twenty-five cents from them.
He was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods as acts of
juvenile delinquency. At the adjudication hearing his attorney's request
for a jury trial was denied. Appellant was subsequently adjudged a delinquent' and placed on probation.2 The Pennsylvania supreme court granted
leave to appeal and held there was no constitutional right to a jury trial
in juvenile court.3 On appeal4 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
and HELD, trial by jury in a state juvenile court is not constitutionally required.5
With the advent of juvenile court legislation, first enacted in Illinois
in 1899,6 a juvenile court system based upon rehabilitation rather than punishment developed throughout the United States. 7 Through the doctrine of
parens patriae, the primary role of the judge was not to ascertain guilt or
innocence but rather to decide the best course of rehabilitation to save the
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I, §243 (4) (1965), provides in pertinent part that the words
"delinquent child" include: "(a) A child [minor under the age of 18] who has violated
any law of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any city, borough, or township . . . ..
2. McKeiver had not been previously arrested and had a record of gainful employment.
The court described the testimony of two of the victims as somewhat "inconsistent" and
"'weak." The Commonwealth's evidence consisted only of the two victims' testimony. One
described the robbery as a gang effort, while the other testified that the thief acted
alone. Both stated the robber did not have glasses, but McKeiver has worn glasses since
childhood. Both said the robber rode a bicycle throughout the event and yet one stated
he identified the robber, McKeiver, by his distinctive walk. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 341-42,
265 A.2d 350, 351 (1970).
3. On appeal the state supreme court consolidated McKeiver's case with that of Edward
Terry to consider the single question of a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile
court. Edward Terry, age 15, was charged with assault and battery of a police officer and
conspiracy as acts of juvenile delinquency. His attorney's request for a jury trial was denied,
and Terry was adjudged a delinquent on the charges and committed to a youth development center. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
4. On appeal to the Supreme Court the cases of McKeiver and Terry were consolidated
with In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969). Burrus itself was a consolidation
of the cases of Barbara Burrus and 45 other juveniles, all of whom were adjudged delinquents on misdemeanor charges under North Carolina law. In each case, counsel's request
for a jury trial was denied, and the general public was excluded from the trials.
5. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Blackmun, J., announced the Court's judgments and delivered an
opinion in which Burger, C.J., and Stewart and White, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in McKeiver and dissenting in
Burrus. Harlan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgments. Douglas, J., filed a
dissenting opinion in which Black and Marshall, JJ., joined.
6. Ill. Laws 1899, §§I-21, at 131 (repealed 1966).
7. Prior to the juvenile court system, youthful offenders were afforded constitutional
safeguards similar to those provided adult criminal offenders and were often given long
prison sentences, incarcerated with hardened criminals, and in some instances even executed. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MiNN. L. Rv. 547, 548 (1957).
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child from a "downward career." 8 If the parental authority needed by the
child was absent or ineffectively administered the state could intervene and,
if necessary, confine the child.9 Non-adversarial proceedings were fashioned
to permit the judge the greatest possible flexibility in exercising his expertise
and quasi-parental authority over the child.10 The juvenile was, therefore,
not afforded the usual constitutional safeguards, and both the right to trial
by jury and the right to a public hearing began to disappear."
The ambitions of the juvenile court system were never fulfilled. Juvenile
court judges were not well qualified;' 2 the juvenile delinquent was still regarded as no less than a young criminal; 3 and the public refused to provide
workable child care centers. 14 The reliability of the juvenile court proceedings became disputable, but arguments questioning the constitutionality of
the system were unsuccessful because the juvenile court was not regarded
as a criminal court, and therefore due process did not apply. 5
In In re Gault' and In re Winship17 the Supreme Court declared that

8. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909).
9. Since juvenile proceedings are, in theory, wholly rehabilitative in spirit, the adjudication of guilt or innocence is not of prime concern. Thus, it has been argued that it
may not be in the child's best interest to win the particular case before the court. See In
re Winship, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 247 N.E.2d 253, 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (1969), rev'd,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
10. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281,
281-82 (1967).
11. E.g., FLA. STAT. §39.09(2) (1969). At the present time Florida is one of at least
29 states plus the District of Columbia that by statute deny juveniles the right to a jury trial.
The following 10 state statutes provide for some form of jury trial: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§37-8-3 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-808 (Supp. 1970); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §712A.17
(1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §10-604.1 (Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §1110
(Supp. 1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §26-8-31 (1967); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
2338-1, §13(b) (1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. §49-5-6 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.25 (2) (Supp.
1970); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-115.24(c) (Supp. 1971).
12. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). Of the 2,987 juvenile court judges
in 1964, one-half had no undergraduate degree, one-fifth had no college education at all,
and one-fifth were not members of the bar. Id. at 80.
13. The early reformers sought to avoid the stigma of criminality by labeling the
child a delinquent rather than a criminal; however, an objective look at the outcome reveals
the same basic stigma being attached to the youth, rendering him undesirable in the competitive business world. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967); In re Holmes, 397 Pa.
599, 611-12, 109 A.2d 523, 528-29 (1954) (Musmanno, J.,dissenting), cert. denied, 348 U.S.

973 (1955).
14. The industrial or reform school is often no more than a prison where the child
is confined with other "delinquents" who have been convicted "for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). See Rappeport, Determination of Delinquency in the Juvenile Court: A Suggested Approach, 1958 WASH.
U.L.Q. 123, 126-27.
15. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944). See generally Thomas v.
United States, 121 F.2d 905 (1941); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871 (1915); Wade v.
Warden, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128 (1950).
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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certain procedural safeguards of the criminal process are applicable to
juvenile hearings and due process requires a juvenile be afforded the right:
(1) to have adequate notice of the charges against him;'18 (2) to counsel; 19
(3) to protection against self-incrimination; 20 (4) to confront accusing witnesses; 2' and (5) to be found delinquent'beyond a reasonable doubt.22 The
Gault court noted that the juvenile proceeding is comprised of three separate
stages: (1) the pre-judicial, which includes arrest, detention, and interrogation; (2) the adjudicative, which is the hearing itself; and (3) the dispositional, in which the judge, attempting to correct adverse influences on the
child, determines the proper disposition of the case. 23 The scope of Gault
and Winship was limited solely to the factfinding or adjudicative stage.
The court felt ihat during this stage the emphasis should be placed upon
the reliability of the guilt-determining process rather than upon insuring
an informal rehabilitative atmosphere.The impact of Gault was as great in its implications as in the fundamental rights it deemed absolutely necessary. In concluding that juveniles
are deprived of a constitutional right to liberty when confined to an institution, 25 the Court cast doubt upon the validity of the parens patriae rationale
as applied to the adjudicative hearing.26 Gault also established that juveniles
may not be denied specific constitutional safeguards simply by labeling the
juvenile proceeding as "civil" rather than "criminal." 27
At the time of this policy change the Supreme Court had not yet decided
whether the right to a jury trial was to be imposed upon the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 28 However, in Duncan
v. Louisiana29 the Court held that due process requires the states to provide
a jury trial in "serious" criminal cases.30 This right was extended in Bloom

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

In re Gault, 887 U.S. 1, 88-34 (1967).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56-57.
In re Winship, 897 US. 858, 861 (1970).
28. In re Gault, 887 US. 1, 13 (1967).
24. For an empirical study on the application of the Gault decision in Florida juvenile
courts, see Note, Delinquency and Denied Rights in Florida'sJuvenile System, 20 U. FLA.

L. REv. 869 (1968).
25. In re Gault, 887 US. 1, 27-28 (1967).
26. Id. at 24-25, 27. However, the Court inferred that the parens patriae rationale
may still serve a useful function in the non-adjudicative stages. Id. at 21-28.
27. Id. at 17, 24. The Court emphasized the fact that Gault was to be confined for up
to six years in an institution in lieu of a maximum sentence of two months that could
have been imposed on an adult committing the same act.
28. The Supreme Court had the chance to rule on the issue of a juvenile's right to
jury trial in DeBacker v. Brainard, 188 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968). However, in a
per curiam opinion the case was dismissed since Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
was to receive prospective application only. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 US. 28 (1969).
29. 891 U.S. 145 (1968).
80. Id. at 149. Duncan failed to give any clear definition as to what constitutes a
"serious" crime, but it did indicate that the dividing line may depend on the maximum
amount of time one may be deprived of his liberty. Id. at 159.
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v. Illinois3l to criminal contempt proceedings, traditionally exempt from the
jury trial requirement.32 Both cases stress that possible incarceration, rather
than the character of the offense or the name given the proceeding, determines
whether a jury trial is an essential element of due process. Thus, these two
cases along with Gault arguably justify a finding that due process includes the
right to a jury trial when a child faces a substantial loss of liberty. The Gault
decision, however, provides no workable standard for determining the applicability of other procedural safeguards not already imposed on juvenile
hearings.33
This lack of a definitive standard has split lower courts on the question
of a juvenile's right to trial by jury. The majority of post-Gault decisions
have denied a juvenile's right to a jury trial for one or more of the following
reasons: (1) juvenile trials are not basically criminal proceedings and therefore do not require jury trials; 34 (2) the persistent validity of the parens
patriae approach negates the need for a jury;3 5 or (3) the constitutional
right to trial by jury does not extend to juveniles.3 6 However, those courts
that have extended jury trials to delinquency proceedings have concluded that
Gault destroyed the civil/criminal distinction between juvenile and adult
proceedings, and therefore the possibility of incarceration was serious enough
to require a jury trial.37
In deciding whether a juvenile has a constitutional right to a jury trial,
the Court in the instant case had to consider whether Duncan38 compelled
a finding that such a right exists. The majority relied on a footnote in the

31. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
32. Id. at 195-97.
33. In addition to trial by jury, Gault and Winship did not determine the applicability
of the following procedural rights: (1) privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(2) extension of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to pretrial statements; (3) right to
bail; (4) right to appeal; and (5) right to a free transcript.
34. E.g., In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970); Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373,
254 N.E.2d 319 (1970); Hopkins v. Youth Court, 227 So. 2d 282 (Miss. 1969); In
re D. 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970); In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d
70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967);
Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
35. E.g., Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971); State v. Turner, 253
Ore. 235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9
(1967); Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.
2d 272, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
36. E.g., Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re Johnson, 255 Md.
1, 255 A.2d 419 (1969); In re J. W., 106 N.J. Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct.
1969); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969); State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235, 453
P.2d 910 (1969); In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
37. E.g., Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); DeBacker v.
Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969) (a
majority of four of the seven judges of the Nebraska supreme court opined that juveniles
had a constitutional right to a jury trial, but the Nebraska constitution required the concurrence of five judges to hold a legislative act unconstitutional); People v. Day, 61 Misc.
2d 786, 306 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Herkimer County Ct. 1969); In re Rindell, 2 BNA Canm. L. REP.
3121 (R.I. Fain. Ct. 1968).
38. See text accompanying note 29 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss2/15

4

1972)

Blank: Constitutional Law: The Jury and the Juvenile Court
CASE COMMENTS

Duncan case 9 as well as on the lack of a jury requirement in other noncriminal cases40 to establish that the jury is not a necessary element to a
fair trial. A careful reading of Duncan, however, reveals that the Duncan
footnote does not support the majority's position. In Duncan the Court
abandoned the traditional selective incorporation formula of whether any
fair and equitable legal system could be imagined without a particular safeguard, and adopted a formula of whether a particular safeguard was fundamental to the Anglo-American system of legal justice. Therefore, when the
Duncan court acknowledged that it could easily imagine a fair and equitable
criminal system that used no juries, it simply illustrated that the existence of
such systems is no longer pertinent because it would be foreign to the AngloAmerican system. 41 Furthermore, reliance upon the nonjury aspects of other
proceedings such as equity and probate avoids the direct issue of whether
the juvenile proceedng is meaningfully different, in form or consequence,
from the adult criminal proceeding.
The majority concluded that the role of the due process clause in juvenile
proceedings is to ensure "fundamental fairness." 42 This is the same approach
used by the Court in Gault and is distinguishable from the "total incorporation" theory proposed by Justice Black, which would require juveniles to
be tried in accordance with all the safeguards of the Bill of Rights.4 3 The
fundamental fairness approach to the due process clause created some confusion because it was not certain whether the Gault Court was concerned
with the due process standard applicable in state criminal prosecutions or
whether it was formulating a different selective due process standard applicable only to the juvenile proceeding."4 In the instant case the majority chose
to follow the latter interpretation and adopted a selective incorporation ap.
proach, which required balancing the desirability of a jury trial in a juvenile
proceeding with the possible burden its presence might place on the substantive benefits of the juvenile system.4 5
Since the emphasis in Gault and Winship was on insuring the reliability
of the factfinding procedures, the majority reasoned that the imposition of
the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not greatly strengthen the
factfinding process and would possibly destroy advances the juvenile system
has made.46 The instant court argued that a jury trial requirement would place
39. 403 US. at 547, dting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 & 158 (1968).
40. 403 US. at 545.
41. See In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 352, 265 A.2d 350, 356 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
42. 403 U.S. at 543.
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967) (concurring opinion).
44. This confusion can be seen in the split among lower courts on the issue of a
juvenile's right to jury trial. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
45. 403 U.S. at 547-50. This approach is analogous to the item-by-item procedure that
the Court had previously taken with respect to the rights of adult defendants in criminal
courts. Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HIv.L. Rxv. 69, 172-73 (1967).
46. 403 U.S. at 547. The Court did not list the present advantages of the non-adversarial nature of the juvenile system. Those most often mentioned include: (1) the flexibility
accorded judges who are experts in sifting out the real problems behind a juvenile's misconduct; (2) separate treatment for juveniles; (3) confidentiality of juvenile records; and
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the juvenile "squarely in the routine of the criminal process,"47 and thus
would destroy the informal, protective, and rehabilitative aspects of the juvenile court. 48 However, as the dissent noted, this need not be so. 49 The fallacy
in assuming that the juvenile system will collapse because of the intrusion
of the jury is in the failure to distinguish the factfinding, or adjudicatory,
stage from the dispositional aspects of a juvenile proceeding50 A jury determines only whether a specific act was committed and is solely concerned with
the adjudicative stage of the hearing. The need for flexibility and informality
exists primarily on the dispositional side where the jury has no place or
function. The judge would still be free to prescribe the formula that will
best aid the particular youth. Furthermore, the informality and protective
aspects of the hearing are not ends in themselves,l1 and their curtailment
during the adjudicatory stage would have only a minor effect on the beneficial aspects of the juvenile system, which mainly occur with the prejudicial
and dispositional stages&52
The majority also argued that a jury trial would possibly destroy the
privacy of the proceedings.5 3 There is strong evidence that juvenile proceedings do not remain confidential; 54 moreover, the right to jury trial does not
necessarily clash with the demand for privacy. A jury trial would not be
mandatory, and thus the child and his parents could waive the right to
obtain maximum secrecy at the hearing. 55 Also, the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Florida6 held that twelve jurors are not necessarily required

(4) a reduction of the stigma accompanying an adjudication of criminal misconduct. See
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1967).
47. 403 U.S. at 547.
48. Id. at 545-47.
49. 403 U.S. at 565-66 (Appendix to dissent).
50. The Court in Gault was careful to make this distinction. See text accompanying
notes 16-24 supra.
51. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 S. CT. REv. 167, 186.
52. See In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 354, 265 A.2d 350, 357 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
53. 403 U.S. at 545. The majority was fearful that inclusion of a jury would lead to
public juvenile trials. Justice Brennan, however, apparently favors the public trial as a
method of protecting the juvenile from governmental oppression and the biased judge.
Justice Brennan therefore concurred in McKeiver, since Pennsylvania did not ban public
juvenile trials, and dissented in Burrus because North Carolina law permitted exclusion of
the general public. Id. at 553-57.
54. The court records are often made available to the police, FBI, and various governmental agencies. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HNRv. L. Rav. 775, 800-01 (1966). Moreover, in many states the exclusion of the
general public from a juvenile hearing is discretionary with the judge. E.g., FLA. STAT.
§39.09 (2) (1969).
55. A survey of delinquency cases in those jurisdictions providing for juvenile jury
trials revealed that requests for juries are not unmanageable. Over a five-and-one-half
year period only 4 juvenile courts, out of 26 surveyed, showed more than 15 jury trial
requests and more than 15 such trials held, or both. 403 U.S. at 561-62 (dissenting opinion).
56. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court noted that the number of jurors should be large
enough to prohibit outside intimidation, promote group discussion, and fairly represent
a cross section of the community. Id. at 100. See Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal
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in a state court. A panel of substantially fewer than twelve on a juvenile
jury could meet the requirements for due process and thereby decrease the
possibility of public exposure. Thus, it would be possible to preserve the
right to a jury's determination of fact; the child could decide either to exercise this right or waive it to acquire maximum privacy.
Although the issue was never specifically discussed, the majority opinion
seemingly accepted the premise that juvenile deliquency proceedings, in
many respects, have become no less than criminal trials57 Justice Harlan,
in his concurring opinion, argued that if this premise were true then juveniles would be constitutionally entitled to jury trials under the Duncan
rationale. 8 The majority reasoned, however, that the juvenile court system
contemplates fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention and that
these elements provide a rational basis for treating juveniles differently from
adults in certain matters of criminal procedure 5 9 This approach may be
desirable in certain circumstances. In Florida, for example, a juvenile must
take affirmative action within ten days after filing notice of appeal,60 while
the adult criminal is given twenty days. 61 The legislative purpose, however,
was to resolve quickly the status of the child in order to expedite rehabilitation.62 Application of different appellate procedures would therefore seem
reasonable. But, as examined previously, the Court's reasons for holding that
due process does not entitle the juvenile to a jury trial are no longer founded
in fact.
The instant case indicates a reversal of the previous trend extending to
the juvenile the total elements of due process of law as applied to the adult
criminal defendant. It would now seem that those procedural safeguards not
already afforded the juvenile63 will be incorporated into the juvenile proJuries: Constitutional,But Are They Fair?,23 U. FLA. L. REv. 402 (1971).
57. 403 U.S. at 550.
58. Id. at 557. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgments on the grounds of his
dissent in Duncan, that is, jury trials are not constitutionally required of the states.
59. Id. at 550.
60. See F.A. APP. R. 3.5 (a).
61. F.A. APP. R. 6.7 (a).
62. Cf. In re Evans, 116 So. 2d 783 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960). See Comment, Beyond Gault
and Winship-

The Best of Both Worlds, 22 U. MiAMi L. REv. 906, 911 (1968).

63. See note 33 supra. It would appear that these unincorporated procedural safeguards
do not pose as great a threat to the current juvenile system and should survive the balancing
test of the present Court. For example, extension of the right to bail and the guarantees
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could provide substantial benefits while imposing
little or no burden. The Supreme Court has stressed that juvenile admissions and confessions require special caution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967). Such caution is certainly
required in respect to confessions obtained at pre-hearing interviews conducted without
counsel. The major argument against extending the Miranda safeguards to pretrial statements is that the juvenile should be encouraged to confess and assume an attitude of
trust and confidence toward the juvenile officials. This argument, however, was partially
rejected by the Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1967). It also clearly loses a great
deal of viability when balanced against the possibilities of coercion. Furthermore, a pre-interview procedure conducted in accordance with the Miranda guarantees would not greatly
hamper the procedures of the juvenile system and would help to impress upon the child
the gravity of the situation and help reduce the chances Qf an unreliable confession.
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ceeding only after a balancing against the ideals of the juvenile court system,
even though these ideals do not coincide with realities of the system. Perhaps
it was just this type of situation that prompted the Warren Court to observe:6'
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions
as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from
the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults.
ROBERT
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EMINENT DOMAIN: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND CONSERVATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Seadade Industries,Inc. v. FloridaPower & Light Co.,
245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971)
Florida Power and Light Company condemned petitioner's land by eminent domain in order to construct a discharge water canal emptying into
Card Sound and Biscayne Bay. Seadade resisted the taking, claiming
it was adverse to the public interest and a gross abuse of the condemning
authority's discretion because approval from federal, state, and local pollution authorities had not been obtained prior to condemnation. Further,
there was evidence the heated discharge waters would damage the ecology
of Biscayne Bay.' Florida Power claimed the taking was for a public purpose
and necessary to its operation, that all statutory requirements pertaining to
condemnation had been met, 2 and that the condemnation proceeding could
not be disturbed unless Seadade demonstrated illegality, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion. 3 The Third District Court of Appeal found that the taking

A constitutional right to bail should also be extended to the juvenile system. The right
to bail is based upon a presumption of innocence and serves to prevent punishment, absent
an adjudication of guilt, while allowing the accused to assist unhampered in the preparation
of his defense. These considerations are as applicable to juveniles as to adults. The main
argument against extending bail to the juvenile system is based upon the child's need for
immediate care. Discharge to the child's parents may not provide this care; indeed, the
parents may be the source of the child's problem. In such instances, release may be extremely detrimental to the child. However, a general right to bail could still be accorded
with provision for an exception for those children dependent upon the state for adequate
care. See Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
64. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).

1. The environmental issues of the instant case were also raised in federal court. See
United States v. Florida Power & Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391, 1392 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
2. FLA. STAT. §§73.021-.171; 74.011-.121; 361.01 (1969).
3. See Canal Authority v. Miller, 245 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1970).
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